

Abstract

THE UNITED STATES MILITARY AND PLAN COLOMBIA: A DIRECT COMBAT ROLE?

By Major Richard J. Koucheravy, United States Army, 59 pages.

This monograph analyzes the possibility of the United States Military taking a direct role in the implementation of Plan Colombia. The analysis begins with an exploration of the background issues: the drug war as it relates to Colombia, the Marxist-based insurgencies that have been ongoing in Colombia, Plan Colombia itself, and the support already pledged by the United States to Colombia. This monograph then traces the national interests at stake in Plan Colombia through the lens of the United States National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the United States Drug Control Policy. Finally, this monograph analyzes U.S. Law and Department of Defense policy to determine what legal support the Defense Department has for involvement in Plan Colombia.

This study concludes that the United States has a number of vital, important, and other national interests at stake in the success of Plan Colombia and that both United States Law, Presidential guidance, and Defense Department Policy support taking a direct role in the counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency operations embedded within Plan Colombia. This study also recommends that the United States create a Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct operations within Colombia to support the Colombian effort as put forth in *Plan Colombia*.

The United States Military and Plan Colombia: A Direct Combat Role?

**A Monograph
by
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
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
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
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Colombia's success in combating the threat of drugs is profoundly in the interest of the United States. A peaceful, democratic, and economically prosperous Colombia will result in a significant reduction in the supply of illicit drugs and help promote democracy and stability throughout the hemisphere.

President William J. Clinton
October 26, 2000¹

The end of the Cold War, signaled by the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, marked the beginning of a new course in United States military affairs. On one hand, the demise of the Soviet Union and the near-death of global communism seemed a clear victory of United States military and economic strength. Peace was now at hand and the United States would reap the "peace dividend." On the other hand, the absence of a peer or near-peer military competitor also served to bring to the forefront the many other threats to United States National Security. Some of these threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the rise of international terrorism, were new to the international scene. Other threats, such as third world instability, rogue states, and environmental pollution had been present all along, but simply came to be viewed with greater urgency. Probably the most important of these "already present threats" to United States national security is illicit drugs.²

Although the United States has been combating illicit drugs for more than a century, the modern "War on Drugs" can be said to have begun under President Richard Nixon in 1973.³ President Ronald Reagan declared the international drug trade a threat to United States national security in National Security Decision Directive 221.⁴ President Bush and President Clinton subsequently reaffirmed this policy. Clinton then gave cabinet rank to the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and made the Director a member of the National Security Council.⁵ Most recently, President Clinton, in his December 1999 National Security Strategy, designated drug trafficking as one of the greatest transnational threats to United States interests, listing it second only to terrorism.⁶

The contemporary event that accelerated and transformed the Drug War was the 1985 killing of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Agent Kiki Camarena. Shortly after 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of February 7, 1985 Agent Camarena placed his badge and sidearm in his desk at the United States Consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico and departed to meet his wife for lunch. He was not seen alive again. It was weeks before his remains were recovered. The subsequent investigation into his killing revealed deep levels of corruption in the Mexican Government, a trail of drugs and money leading across Mexico into South American, and the conflicting interests of American diplomatic, economic, and intelligence efforts in the hemisphere. In addition, a grisly audio tape recording of his torture and killing revealed the possible involvement of the Mexican Secret Police.⁷

Drugs, drug trafficking, and the insidious effects of related crime and corruption threaten to tear at the very fabric of America's most important institutions. In 1999 more than 15 million Americans were categorized as current illicit drug users.⁸ Estimates are that more than 50,000 Americans die of drug-related causes each year.⁹ In 1999 America spent almost \$20 Billion (combined at all levels) fighting drug use and trafficking.¹⁰ This dollar figure is independent of monies spent on crime, corruption, and health issues related to illicit drug use.¹¹ Some studies, endorsed by the Office on National Drug Control Strategy, reveal that illegal drug use costs the United States between \$110 and \$200 Billion annually.¹²

From 1996 until his resignation in early 2001, retired Army General Barry McCaffrey was the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, a.k.a. the "Drug Czar".¹³ Until his permanent replacement is named, the strategy drafted during his tenure remains in effect. The strategy that General McCaffrey promulgated is a two-tiered one of reducing demand for drugs within the United States while interdicting the supply of drugs from both domestic and foreign sources.¹⁴ General McCaffrey's approach is a holistic one that endeavors to combine the efforts of government and civil institutions at all levels to reduce the incidence of illicit drug use while reducing the flow of drugs from their sources as well.

The three illicit drugs most prevalent in our society are marijuana, cocaine (of which "crack" is a derivative), and heroin.¹⁵ Colombia is America's primary source for cocaine¹⁶ and a secondary source for marijuana and heroin.¹⁷ Success in the past decade at reducing cocaine imports from other South American countries has been met with an increase in cocaine production and import from Colombia, and thus an increase in Colombia's relative importance as a source of illicit drugs.¹⁸

Colombia's involvement with the drug trade is exacerbated by the fact that the country has been fighting a Marxist-based insurgency for nearly three decades. Both The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and The National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia's two main insurgent foes, have been using profits from the drug trade to finance their campaigns.¹⁹ Recently, Colombian President Pastrana announced a \$7.5 billion campaign, *Plan Colombia*, aimed at promoting the peace process, combating the narcotics industry, reviving the Colombian economy, strengthening democracy, and improving human rights within the state.²⁰ Colombia is looking to the international community to provide \$3.5 billion of those funds.²¹ The United States has pledged \$1.3 billion to assist in the effort, in addition to more than \$330 million previously pledged.²² Additionally, the United States continues to support Colombian efforts in other non-financial ways without committing United States forces to a direct military role within Colombia.²³

The broad scope of issues covered in the *Plan* makes the United States' role in support of it unique. By pledging support, the United States becomes involved not only in fighting the international drug trade, but in assisting with a counterinsurgency as well. Furthermore, the issues covered under *Plan Colombia* are neither strictly military nor strictly civil, but a degree of both. Thus, any United States military involvement in Colombia becomes joint and combined, as well as interagency.

This monograph proposes to scrutinize United States involvement in *Plan Colombia* to determine whether or not it is in the national interests of the United States to take a direct military

role in Colombia in support of the *Plan*. This monograph will begin by exploring the background of the major issues involved: the Drug War, Colombia's insurgency, and *Plan Colombia*. In researching the Drug War, the monograph will place emphasis on Colombia's role in the supply of illicit drugs. The monograph will explore the background of the insurgency in Colombia to determine how the insurgency effects the drug trade and visa versa. As a final look into the background of the issues, the monograph will explore *Plan Colombia* itself, to include how Colombia, The United States, and other countries view the issues contained therein and plan to support the effort.

This monograph will then trace the issues at stake in *Plan Colombia* against the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the National Drug Control Strategy. In particular, the monograph will determine what national interests are at stake (ends), how the United States attempts to achieve those interests (ways), and what military resources might be applied in Colombia to those purposes (means).

Lastly, this monograph will attempt to determine how the Department of Defense views its obligations toward supporting *Plan Colombia*. While the United States has, in the past, been involved in counterinsurgency or stability operations (e.g., Vietnam, Korea, and Somalia), direct military involvement in counter-narcotics operations within the bounds of another country is an entirely different matter. What has the Department of Defense been assigned to do in support of the Drug War? What statutes, directives, and other obligations exist that might serve to justify the use of military force in Colombia in support of *Plan Colombia*? This monograph will attempt to judge whether or not these existing directives are in line with this nation's security, drug control, and military strategies.

The criteria that this monograph will use to determine whether it is in the interests of the United States to take a direct military role in Colombia are threefold. The first two criteria are contained within the National Security Strategy of the United States: First, is the safety of the citizens of the United States at stake? Second, is it in the interests of the United States to support

the human rights and democratization aspects of *Plan Colombia*?²⁴ The last criterion to be used is whether or not there is a firm legal/statutory basis for direct involvement in *Plan Colombia*.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DRUG WAR, COLOMBIA AND *PLAN COLOMBIA*

While the world was greeting the end of the Cold War with euphoria, a war of much longer duration continued unabated. It appears that the twentieth century will end as it began, with the United States at battle against the international drug trade.

H. Richard Friman
NarcoDiplomacy²⁵

THE DRUG PROBLEM

The drug problem has been part of America's cultural landscape for a long time. Most Americans today simply accept that the war must be fought without an explicit understanding of the problem itself. Therefore, it is important that this analysis begin with a statement of the drug problem. What exactly is the drug problem? The problem is that a large number of Americans use illicit drugs. In 1999, the last full year for which figures exist, more than 15 million Americans categorized themselves as regular drug users.²⁶ This means that one in every twenty Americans regularly uses illegal drugs. The staggering effects of this deadly American pastime can be categorized in three broad dimensions: the public health dimension, the public safety dimension, and the economic/sociological dimension.²⁷

The public health dimension of the drug problem manifests itself in a number of ways. Although each type of drug acts in a unique way, gives individual users different effects, and impacts on users' health differently, illicit drugs have some health effects in common. Drug use causes a direct negative impact on the health of the user.²⁸ That effect can be immediate or more chronic in nature. Overdose can often occur when abusers use too much of the substance either out of ignorance or as a result of increased doses required due to an increase in the body's tolerance of the drug. Drug use can also be addictive. The degree of physiological and/or psychological addiction can differ from drug to drug, but addiction nearly always causes a degree of compulsive drug-seeking.²⁹ Drug use is also a known vector of infectious disease. AIDS,

hepatitis, and tuberculosis are all either directly or indirectly transmitted by drug use or by behavior associated with drug use.³⁰

The public safety dimension of drug use has a tremendous impact on every American. Drug use and trafficking causes a wide range of criminal behavior. Aside from the illegal drug use itself, drug users are more likely to engage in criminal behavior, ranging from simple assault to murder, and are also more prone to engage in criminal behavior designed to support the drug habit.³¹ Drug use is also a major factor behind organized criminal behavior. Organized crime in America has reached a new level with the appearance of Asian, Caribbean, and American gangs who specialize in the drug trade.³² Drug using employees are also more prone to accidents and are a major concern for air carriers, railroad operators, shippers and others in the transportation industry. Industry as a whole takes great care to insure that operators of machinery and technologies are drug-free.³³

The economic/sociological dimension of drug use is tremendous as well. Estimates are that drug use accounts for more than \$110 billion in expenses and lost revenue annually.³⁴ Health-related expenses due to drugs are upwards of \$10 billion per year.³⁵ Businesses experience loss of productivity, schools have trouble teaching as they concentrate on keeping schools and students safe and drug-free, and law enforcement agencies battle the tendency of some officials to become corrupted by the lure of drug profits.³⁶ These are but a few of the many and insidious effects that illicit drug use has upon our society and economy.

Because this study focuses on *Plan Colombia*, it is important to take a closer look at the three drugs for which Colombia is a major supplier. The three illicit drugs most prevalent in America are cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. In 1998, Americans spent \$61.3 billion on those three drugs out of approximately \$65 billion total spent on unlawful drugs, or more than 94%.³⁷ The remaining \$3.7 billion was spent on methamphetamines, inhalants, hallucinogens, stimulants, and other drugs.³⁸ Of the three drugs in question, only marijuana is cultivated inside the United States; however, the United States obtains a majority of its marijuana from foreign countries.

Colombia trails only Mexico as America's largest source of marijuana.³⁹ Colombia has recently eclipsed Peru as America's primary source for cocaine.⁴⁰ Heroin is probably the most widely cultivated drug in the world. It is grown in South America, Southwest Asia, and Southeast Asia. However, Colombia is the largest producer of heroin in the Western Hemisphere and is a major source for America's users.⁴¹

Cocaine, once a drug of the wealthy, has become widely prevalent throughout American society.⁴² In its powder form, it is inhaled through the nose, but may also be liquefied and injected intravenously, either by itself or in combination with heroin (a "speedball").⁴³ Crack, cocaine that has been processed into small nodules, is smoked.⁴⁴ Cocaine acts to inhibit dopamine removal from around brain cell neurons, causing a feeling of euphoria.⁴⁵ Measured in terms of money spent, cocaine is the most widely used drug in America. In 1998, 1.5 million Americans were identified as current cocaine users, spending more than \$39 billion on cocaine of the \$65 billion spent on illicit drugs.⁴⁶ In 1998 Colombia cultivated more than 51.5% of the coca leaf (115,450 of 223,875 hectares) cultivated in the Americas, the area of supply for nearly all of America's cocaine.⁴⁷

Heroin, derived from morphine (a product of the poppy plant), is a crystalline powder⁴⁸ that is usually injected intravenously, but may also be inhaled or smoked.⁴⁹ Heroin is highly addictive and forces users to increase dosage as the user become immune to the euphoric effects of the drug. Although heroin has fewer addicts than cocaine or marijuana, heroin has a reputation as the "hardest" drug because more deaths and overdoses are associated with it than with other drugs.⁵⁰ Heroin expenditures accounted for only \$11.6 billion of the \$65 billion spent by drug users in 1998, but its highly addictive nature and harsh effects account for its disproportionate share of criminal, health, and economic effect upon American society. The major worldwide sources of opium are in Southwest Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and Southeast Asia (Burma, Laos, and Thailand).⁵¹ However, Colombia is the major producer of heroin in the Americas; its proximity to the United States makes it the major secondary source for the United States heroin market.⁵²

Marijuana, probably the most readily available and widely used of the three "Colombian" drugs, is the least understood. It has been alternately classified as a stimulant, a depressive, and a hallucinogen.⁵³ Marijuana, dried and shredded much the same way that tobacco is prepared, is commonly smoked in cigarettes or pipes, but may also be ingested through food. Its acute effect is not as serious as those of cocaine and heroin are, but it is a dangerous drug nonetheless. Although marijuana has hundreds of chemical compounds, the primary reactor is delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).⁵⁴ Because marijuana is smoked in unfiltered cigarettes and held longer in the lungs, its deleterious effects upon the lungs are greater than that of cigarettes. Marijuana also causes short-term memory loss and reproductive interference.⁵⁵ The long-term effects are largely unknown, as the drug has not been used widely for long. However, chronic mental changes, in the guise of "amotivational syndrome," are beginning to manifest themselves in long-term users.⁵⁶ In 1999, marijuana accounted for \$10.7 billion out of the \$65 billion spent on drugs in America.⁵⁷ Colombia accounted for approximately 20% of the marijuana imported in the United States, with the vast majority of the remaining 80% coming from Mexico.⁵⁸

THE DRUG WAR

The modern use of narcotics for "recreation" is not a new phenomenon in the history of the United States or the "western" world. Cocaine, opium, and heroine all initially entered the United States as substances viewed as having medicinal benefits.⁵⁹ However, recreational use was not initially proscribed. In the 1800s Britain was protecting – and even licensing – the India-China opium trade while the United States looked askance.⁶⁰ However, shortly after the United States Civil War the United States Government began to accept that these substances had very limited value and were even a bane upon society. The widespread use of morphine to treat battlefield injuries during the United States Civil War increased addiction to the extent that the phrase "soldier's disease" came into being to describe addicted veterans.⁶¹ Perhaps the same sentiment that led to Prohibition later in the 1920s also led to a national consensus opposing non-medicinal

use of drugs.⁶² This prompted American actions at international drug interdiction around the turn of the century.

Until recently, the United States effort to end illicit drug use was characterized by two things: the attempt to reduce drug supply and the cyclical reactive process whereby initiatives were met by reactions from organized drug suppliers which were met by subsequent counter-initiatives by the government⁶³. The former of these characteristics left the supply demand part of the drug problem virtually unchallenged, except for the criminal prosecution of drug abusers. Little else has been done, until recent time, to abate demand, reform abusers, or face the underlying causes of drug abuse and addiction. The latter of these characteristics has challenged the United States Government to create increasingly sophisticated methods of fighting the drug supply problem. In all, the abuse of illicit drugs has generally increased over time until it has reached the epidemic proportions of the current day. Even today, there appears to be no national consensus on exactly how the United States Government should fight drug abuse. Although World War I, World War II, the Chinese Revolution, and the Cold War all overshadowed the international anti-drug effort, the issue remained alive in United States foreign and domestic policy throughout the years.

Early efforts at fighting the drug problem were largely focused at the local level. Opium smoking was popular in commercial “dens” in California in the 1800s. The City of San Francisco enacted legislation prohibiting the smoking of Opium in 1875.⁶⁴ United States national efforts at leading the international anti-drug effort began with a meeting in Shanghai, China in 1905.⁶⁵ Again in 1909 the United States convened the Shanghai Commission to help China with the opium trade.⁶⁶ In that same year the United States passed the “Opium Act” which prohibited the import of opium, except for medicinal purposes.⁶⁷ However, the law had significant loopholes and did little to abate the problem. There appears to have been little thought to using United States military power in the fight against the international drug trade during this period.

The first significant piece of legislation to fight drug addiction came in the form of the Harrison Act in 1914. Passed as a result of the United States-led international Opium Conference

in 1912, the law licensed drug dealing, created a drug schedule, taxed the sale of drugs, and controlled interstate drug movement.⁶⁸ The Harrison Act was the dominant factor surrounding the United States policy toward drug abuse for the next fifteen years. In 1930, due to government abuses from the combined drug and liquor prohibitions (such as rampant corruption), the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was created within the Treasury Department to regulate the drug laws.⁶⁹ The only use of military power in the drug war up to this time dates from the early days of prohibition when the United States Coast Guard interdicted "rum runners" attempting to import liquor and drugs into the country.⁷⁰ During this period, the United States largely isolated itself from the international drug war.⁷¹

Beginning in the 1930s, marijuana, not previously regulated under the Harrison Act, came to the forefront of the drug culture. Although it was not initially seen as dangerous, by 1937 marijuana was prohibited in every state.⁷² From 1927 until the early 1950s, the fight against drug abuse went virtually unchanged. With the passage of the Boggs Act in 1951, however, the link between drug abuse and criminal behavior began to manifest itself. The Boggs Act increased penalties and placed further restrictions on the medicinal use of drugs.⁷³ The pre-World War II through 1945 time period saw little direct military involvement in the drug war. Peru and Bolivia provided cocaine to the allies under the Lend-Lease Program while at the same time the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) concerned itself with opium production in Iran and China.⁷⁴ However, in all cases the need to retain allies and prosecute the war took precedence over the drug war.

The period between the 1950s and the late 1960s saw little real change in the international aspects of the drug war. The Cold War dominated United States foreign policy and placed concern for the drug problem on the national back burner in much the same way that World War II had. However, the end of World War II had seen a dramatic rise in rates of addiction and the resurgence of an active drug trade from Mexico.⁷⁵ The Prettyman Commission convened in 1963

to make recommendations concerning the recent flare up of drug abuse in the early 1960s. The commission's recommendations, most of which were later adopted, included:

1. The transfer of jurisdiction for enforcement of illicit drug laws from the Department of Treasury (DOT) to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
2. The transfer of jurisdiction for the medicinal use of drugs from the DOT to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
3. A substantial increase in the number of federal agents enforcing drug laws.
4. A strict control on all narcotic drugs capable of producing serious psychotoxic effects when abused.⁷⁶

Another significant happening in the 1960s was the signing of the worldwide 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the creation of the Bureau of Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in 1968 out of the FBN.⁷⁷

America's contemporary "war on drugs" began with President Richard Nixon's Inaugural Address in 1968. With the passing of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970, Nixon began a six-year effort to curb both drug supply and drug demand.⁷⁸ Nixon's policy vis-à-vis drugs coupled drug law enforcement with military assistance, interdiction and eradication. There was a limited amount of reorganization of federal activities involved in the drug "offensive".⁷⁹ Another significant occurrence during Nixon's tenure was the creation of the Drug Enforcement Agency in 1973.⁸⁰ As a result, Nixon became the first American President to take the initiative in fighting illicit drugs. Unfortunately, neither the Ford nor Carter administrations carried on the drug war with Nixon's enthusiasm or vigor,⁸¹ and, just as Nixon before them, neither Ford nor Carter put military power to the drug war.

President Reagan quickly brought the United States drug war back to the forefront of American foreign and domestic policy. Just as Nixon before him, Reagan intensified American efforts, but added other initiatives. These included:

1. Crop eradication coupled with programs to replace drug crops in local economies.

2. Drug interdiction at United States borders, in international waters, and in the air.
3. Increased prosecution of drug-traffickers and money-launderers.
4. Seizure of assets from drug-related arrests.⁸²

Reagan's efforts began to put more substance to the drug war. In using Nixon's policy, but adding economic incentives to growers, assaults on drug profits, and property seizures, Reagan can be credited with formulating today's comprehensive drug control policy.

Reagan can also be credited with militarizing the drug war. Reagan, and his Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, brought military force to bear in a number of ways. As a result of an international drug summit held in Cartagena, Colombia in 1990, United States military aid was offered (and used) to assist against drug production and trafficking. Another way in which military aid was brought to bear was an increase in the amount of interdiction of drugs along the border performed by the Coast Guard. Lastly, Reagan and Weinberger began instituting inter-agency operations between the DOD and the DEA, FBI, and Customs Service.⁸³

President Bush, likely because he helped to formulate Reagan's drug policies, simply continued Reagan's policies. Unfortunately, Reagan also passed along to Bush a booming economy, which also led to increased drug purity and availability, lower prices, and the scourge of "crack" – a highly addictive and cheaper variety of powdered cocaine.⁸⁴ This led to a more comprehensive policy than under Reagan. The 1990 Drug Control Strategy had similar domestic policies to that of Reagan's, albeit with increased military support to law enforcement. However, Bush's policy expanded the international component. This component included:

1. Anti-narcotics economic assistance to drug-producing countries.
2. Disruption of drug-trafficking activities (destruction of labs, chemicals, and assets), versus eradicating crops.
3. Encouragement of military involvement of drug-producing countries in counter-narcotics.
4. Enhanced United States military support for those same nations.⁸⁵

Today's War on Drugs is largely a result of Reagan's and Bush's efforts, combined with those efforts of the Clinton Administration. While the administrations between 1980 and 1992 created great momentum, President Clinton made significant changes in the way that the war was prosecuted. Clinton's greatest contributions to the drug war were organizational. As stated before, he gave cabinet rank to the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and made the Director a member of the National Security Council.⁸⁶ In his December 1999 National Security Strategy, just as Bush and Reagan before him, he designated drug trafficking as one of the greatest threats to United States interests.⁸⁷

THE COLOMBIAN INSURGENCY

Any analysis of *Plan Colombia* must include an understanding of the Colombian drug trade. The drug trade is only half of the Colombian "problem" to be solved by *Plan Colombia*. It is equally important to understand the insurgency that has been taking place inside Colombia for the past two to four (depending upon how one dates the insurgency) decades. It is the synergy of the drug trade, the government, the military and paramilitary forces, and the Colombian economy that serve to make the Colombian quagmire a threat to regional stability.

Although Colombia has been the scene of near constant turmoil since the early days of western exploration, the modern origins of today's Colombian insurgency can be found in the 1950's dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla. Pinilla led a coup d'état in June of 1953, signaling an end to a democratic period that had initially begun in 1946.⁸⁸ This coup brought an end to La Violencia, but Pinilla's dictatorship lasted only a few years. A junta took over in 1958, which quickly gave way to the National Front period that lasted until 1974. The National Front was basically a power-sharing agreement between the conservative and liberal wings of Colombian politics. Unfortunately, during this period dissent of third parties was repressed, land reform was hindered by large landholders, and the gap between the urban elite and rural poor began to expand greatly.⁸⁹ It was also during this time of exclusionary representation that Colombia's modern insurgency was born.

In 1964, students disenchanted by The (pro-USSR) Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista de Colombia – PCC) and enamored by Castro’s Cuban regime, formed The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN).⁹⁰ In 1966, another insurgent group, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), formed and quickly became the military arm of the PCC.⁹¹ Other factions, such as The Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL), a pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist group begun in 1968, and the M-19 (from the 19th April Movement) begun in 1970, showed up on the scene, though in modern times they have diminished in importance.⁹² These factions, as well as numerous smaller marginal groups, have been conducting their insurgencies ever since.

In 1974, weakened by decades of political conflict, Colombia successfully and peacefully transitioned to a multi-party open democracy. However, it was around that time that drug-traffickers and drug profits began to transform drastically Colombian politics. While the drug trade created an influx of capital, it was – and still is – largely detrimental to the Colombian economy. Marijuana and cocaine cultivation led to slash and burn cultivation methods that destroyed fertile land and reduced food production, causing the country to import food for the first time. Also, drug profits were largely spent on conspicuous consumption, rather than in investment and for the benefit of local economies. Drug money, in fact, created a parallel economy that competed with the official economy for financial resources. This parallel economy “contaminated” the official economy by purchasing legitimate businesses, laundering money, and destroying any ability to conduct financial planning, all while denying the government tax revenues from this large, unregulated, and unofficial economy. Lastly, the drug trade drained funds that could have been more efficiently applied elsewhere to the benefit of the whole society.⁹³

The FARC has been the largest of the Colombian insurgencies. Today, the FARC numbers approximately 15,000-17,000 active members,⁹⁴ although its membership was probably under 10,000 for most of its existence.⁹⁵ The opening of Colombian-Soviet relations in 1968 negated

FARC successes in the late 1960s, as normalized relations with the United States served to undermine FARC legitimacy. The FARC saw resurgence in the late 1970s as membership pushed upwards of 6,000. There was little coordinated work done between the FARC and other factions due to ideological differences, thus the FARC has mostly operated alone. In the early 1980s, the FARC suffered from right-wing death squads – probably connected to the Colombian military and police forces – which were probably responsible for upwards of 550 FARC deaths.⁹⁶

The long-term objective of the FARC is difficult to divine. Recent FARC public affairs operations, as the FARC has begun to negotiate with the government of President Pastrana, have shed some light on the FARC's Objectives. The FARC's stated demands include agrarian reform, increased social spending, and reform of the military/paramilitary/police forces.⁹⁷ The insistence upon agrarian reform is both understandable and reasonable. As recently as 1988, more than 80% of farmland was owned by less than 10% of farmland owners. This has resulted in inadequate investment credit and uneven agricultural inputs.⁹⁸ Increases in social spending are also reasonable to demand, as the Colombian economy has been hindered by high inflation, causing the government to curtail social programs to relieve decades of deficit spending. Military reform is a tougher nut to crack. Right wing death squads have generally been the result of frustration on the part of the military and police to counter both the insurgent organizations and the drug cartels.⁹⁹ The FARC has been in a two-year period of on-and-off negotiations with the Colombian Government.

The ELN, the smaller of the two prominent insurgent organizations, is the Cuban influenced communist insurgent group. The ELN today numbers between 4,000 and 5,000 members, probably never having been much larger than it is today.¹⁰⁰ The ELN initiated a flurry of activity after its founding in the late 1960s, activity that tapered off sharply during the 1970s. In the early 1980s, Colombian President Betancur managed to initiate truces with virtually all of the insurgent groups by making pacification a high priority in his domestic agenda. These truces fell apart in

the mid-1980s as the insurgent groups – the ELN among them – grew disenchanted with Betancur's reforms.¹⁰¹

The goals and objectives of the ELN are also difficult to discern. However, it is safe to assume that the ELN's goals are not so different to those of the FARC. Just as with the FARC, the ELN has been willing to negotiate with the Colombian Government. However, a part of the ELN's demands has been to insist upon separate negotiations from the FARC and an unwillingness to participate in any multi-lateral negotiations.

FARC and ELN operations have been quite similar. Both organizations were initially urban and student/intellectual based. However, over time each organization has migrated to the country, as the government has been successful in rooting out urban-based insurgent infrastructure. The result is a series of hit-and-run urban guerilla operations followed by quick retreats to the large and sparsely populated interior, dominated by the insurgents and private drug-trafficking armies.¹⁰² Another similarity between the FARC and ELN, a recent development that has been both insidious and complicating, is the cooperation between them and the drug-traffickers.

Sometime in the early 1980s the Colombian and United States Governments began to get wind of formal cooperation between the insurgent organizations and the drug lords. The problematic cooperation of these two sets of organizations likely began as a quid pro quo. As the guerrillas moved into the agrarian south and took control, the Colombian Government did not have the resources to penetrate these areas. Coincidentally, these were the same regions that the drug-traffickers coveted to grow coca leave, marijuana, and heroin. In exchange for protection by the insurgents, the drug-traffickers provided them with resources to prosecute their campaigns. This also gave the drug-traffickers the added benefit of having government forces occupied with the drug war to the exclusion of the insurgent war.¹⁰³

The cooperation of the drug-traffickers with the FARC and ELN has created a rather strange situation. Neither of these insurgencies has had much of a popular following in Colombia. This

is due to a number of factors. First and foremost, Colombia is neither a dictatorship nor does it have an overly oppressive government. Colombia is a democracy, with democratic experiences going back at least one hundred years. Although plagued with periods of political violence and military rule, most Colombians have lived during times of relative political freedom. The second reason that Colombian communism has not caught on has probably been the decline of worldwide communism. While China and Cuba – both strong influences within the FARC and ELN – remain communist, the specter of becoming a regional pariah is unlikely to help insurgent ideology. Third, Colombia has had a history of free-market capitalism that lasted throughout the period of the insurgencies. Colombians are unlikely to want to trade in their free market for communist poverty.

The most recent guerrilla operations indicate that the FARC will intensify conflict in developed areas of Colombia. Currently, the ELN concentrates operations in the north, east and west. The ELN is estimated to have the bulk of its fighters in north and east Colombia, although it recently moved a unit into the Narino Department at the southwest tip of Colombia, next to the heavy FARC concentration in the Department of Putumayo where more than 50% of coca leave is cultivated.¹⁰⁴

In summary, the insurgent campaigns of the FARC and ELN have not, in their three plus decades of history, been able to create much of a following. They remain small, but determined outposts of discontent upon the fringes of Colombian extremism. What little legitimacy that they were able to create in early days has evaporated. The situation in Colombia is best summarized by last year's White House statement concerning support for *Plan Colombia*:

Illegal armed groups are responsible for the overwhelming majority of human rights violations committed in Colombia, and they are a threat to Colombia's democracy and legitimate economy. High levels of violence, kidnapping, and extortion, and attacks on infrastructure are displacing large numbers of rural inhabitants and discouraging both Colombian and foreign investment. Drug money and income from kidnapping and extortion has produced a paradoxical situation in which the guerrillas and mercenary groups are militarily strong, politically weak, and generally feared. The reluctance of the guerrillas to attempt

an evolution from a military to a political force is undermining the Colombian Government's good faith efforts to negotiate peace with them.¹⁰⁵

PLAN COLOMBIA

By the late 1990s the insurgent war and the incredible amount of violence that had gripped the country for the preceding few decades had exhausted most Colombians. Andres Pastrana was elected President in 1998 with a mandate to pursue a peace settlement with the guerrillas and revive the economy battered by a decrease in worldwide oil demand and ravages of the drug war.¹⁰⁶ Pastrana seemed to follow through on his campaign promises early on when, with the help of the United States State Department, he managed to bring the FARC to the negotiating table in San Vicente del Caguan, a remote town in the "demilitarized" part of the Colombian interior.¹⁰⁷ Unfortunately, two years of talks made almost no progress. The guerrillas suspended talks in November 2000. Since then, FARC and ELN violence has increased as unemployment rose to quarter-century high levels. Further exacerbating the problem has been the Conservative Pastrana's inability to push important economic legislation through a Liberal Party dominated Legislature.¹⁰⁸

While negotiating with the guerrillas and writing legislation to relieve the economic crisis, President Pastrana began to develop *Plan Colombia* in late 1999. *Plan Colombia* is difficult to summarize. General McCaffrey describes it as an "integrated strategy" to solve "inter-related problems" requiring "significant action on a variety of fronts".¹⁰⁹ In that vein, *Plan Colombia* appears to be a type of national security strategy, although much more focused on a specific series of problems. This language has been taken almost verbatim out of President Pastrana's press release on *Plan Colombia*.¹¹⁰ The President describes his plan as a strategy to "address the related problems of armed conflict, drug trafficking, human rights violations, and environmental degradation" while facing the "worst economic crisis in its history."¹¹¹

Plan Colombia covers five basic issues: the peace process; the Colombian economy; the counter-drug effort; the reform of the justice system and the protection of human rights; and

democratization and social development. These five issues correspond to the most pressing of Colombia's problems. Interestingly, President Pastrana claims that these problems are symptomatic of the fact that Colombia has

...yet to consolidate its power: a lack of confidence in the capacity of the armed forces, the police, and the judicial system to guarantee order and security; a credibility crisis at different levels and in different agencies of the government; and corrupt practices in the public and private sectors. All this has been fed and aggravated by the enormous destabilizing effects of drug trafficking, which, with vast economic resources, has constantly generated indiscriminate violence while undermining our values, on a scale comparable only to the era of Prohibition in the United States.¹¹²

President Pastrana's *Plan* and the preface quoted above are remarkable for a number of reasons. The first remarkable thing about the *Plan* is the fact that it admits to government abuses in the areas of justice and human rights. No strategic plan to cure Colombia's ills could possibly work without facing the fact that its courts are not free from corruption, that drug money and influence have penetrated government agencies, and that the military and police have participated in repression of the worst kind. Although *Plan Colombia* does not specifically address the death squad issue, it is evident from reading the *Plan* in its entirety that President Pastrana is admitting the government's culpability.

Evidence of this is the fact that Pastrana's relations with the Colombian military have degraded since the inception of *Plan Colombia*. In 1999, the military's leaders barely averted a coup by more junior officers. The military is opposed to the peace talks with the FARC and ELN, is unhappy with concessions that Pastrana has made to the guerrilla groups, and is discontented with Pastrana's purges of the officer corps for human rights abuses. Further serving to deteriorate relations is the widely held belief among Pastrana's Washington allies that the Colombian military is incompetent and corrupt.¹¹³

The second remarkable thing about Pastrana's opening comments in *Plan Colombia* is his reference to the United States and its Prohibition era. Pastrana could be making that reference for a number of reasons. One reason is that he may be trying to counter the idea that Colombia's

drug-trafficking problem is not beyond redemption. Another reason may be that he is reminding the United States of its own culpability for creating the drug demand that fuels the Colombian drug trade. Still another reason may be that by referencing the United States Prohibition era, he makes it more likely that the United States will identify Colombia with its own history and provide support for the *Plan*.

In more specific terms *Plan Colombia* expands the five basic issues into ten elements or “strategies”. These elements, and their basic descriptions, are:

1. An Economic Strategy. This element of the Plan aims to generate employment, support the collection of tax revenues, and develop a “counterbalancing force” to the drug-traffic economy. An alternate component of this element is the expansion of international trade and the opening of foreign markets through trade agreements and foreign investments.
2. A Fiscal and Financial Strategy. This element of the *Plan* includes “tough austerity and adjustment measures” to boost economic recovery and recover the Colombian fiscal position. As previously stated, Colombia has recently been in deficit spending to keep government services viable for the past 10-15 years.
3. A Peace Strategy. This is a key component of the *Plan*. It seeks to implement a negotiated (rather than military) solution to the insurgency, “on the basis of territorial integrity, democracy, and human rights”. Pastrana feels this will fight drug-trafficking and improve the rule of law.
4. A National Defense Strategy. This element of the Plan seeks to modernize and reorganize the military and police in order to improve the rule of law, combat organized crime, reduce drug trafficking, and promote human rights. This part of the plan contains those activities that could involve United States military support.
5. A Judicial and Human Rights Strategy. This element of the Plan seeks to build upon initiative already in place to improve Colombia’s respect for human rights and international

norms. This is a veiled reference to the elimination of military and paramilitary abuses within the organs of Colombian security.

6. A Counter-Narcotics Strategy. One of the more controversial and potentially explosive parts of the Plan, this strategy seeks to eliminate drug-trafficking by interdicting drugs from point of origin (cultivation) to asset laundering and arms dealing. The Plan labels drugs the “fuel of violence”. This is the second part of the plan that could involve United States military support.
7. An Alternative Development Strategy. This is the element of the plan that seeks to replace coca, marijuana, and poppy cultivation with alternate means of economic production for “peasant farmers and their families”. Included in this element are initiatives to reduce deforestation and environmental degradation. The *Plan* stresses that many of the areas of the country involved have “low state presence”, such as the “Middle Magdalena Valley, the Macizo Colombiano, and the southwest.”
8. A Social Participation Strategy. This part of the Plan is aimed at “collective awareness.” This seems one of the more ambitious elements of the Plan. It seeks to: minimize corruption at local and regional level; reduce the internal displacement of personnel (drug war refugees); foster cooperation between government, business, and labor; and promote cultural and social tolerance to reduce violence.
9. A Human Development Strategy. This element of the Plan seeks to improve education and health while reducing poverty.
10. An International-Oriented Strategy. This part of the Plan has two purposes. One purpose seems to be insuring that the international “drug demand” part of the drug war is shouldered by net drug-importing nations (the United States and European countries?). The second purpose is to insure that Colombia conforms to international law and standards while continuing the peace process.¹¹⁴

The financial resources needed by Colombia to support *The Plan* are enormous. Pastrana has stated that *Plan Colombia*'s initiatives require more than \$7.5 billion to implement. He pledged more than \$4 billion in Colombian financing, with some of that \$4 billion coming in the form of loans that must be repaid. He has called on the international community to provide the remaining \$3.5 billion to support the effort.¹¹⁵ To date, Japan, Norway, and Spain have pledged support totaling \$1 billion.¹¹⁶ The European Union (EU), following negotiations with the Colombian government in April 2001, pledged to provide \$300 million, but limited its support to "social programmes (that) would be kept separate from the plan's military component."¹¹⁷ The United States has pledged \$1.3 billion, in addition to more than \$330 million previously pledged for support of Colombia's counter-narcotics and military reform efforts.¹¹⁸

UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR *PLAN COLOMBIA*

In late 2000 the United States Congress approved an "emergency supplemental" funding package of \$1.3 billion that President Clinton quickly signed into law. This money, added to more than \$330 million previously approved by the Congress¹¹⁹, has been earmarked for specific items within Colombian President Pastrana's *Plan Colombia* and goes hand-in-hand with other non-monetary support promised by the United States. The nearly \$1.63 billion in support is intended to help Colombia "fight the illicit drug trade, to increase the rule of law, to protect human rights, to expand economic development, to institute judicial reform, and to foster peace."¹²⁰

The United States support package for *Plan Colombia* has five components. These five components are: support for human rights and judicial reform, expansion of counter-narcotics operations into southern Colombia, alternative economic development, increased interdiction, and assistance for the Colombian National Police.¹²¹

More than \$122 million is earmarked to support human rights and judicial reform, including all efforts aimed at strengthening the Colombian democracy and the rule of law within Colombia. Some specific highlights of this part of the funding package include monies to protect human

rights non-governmental organizations, strengthening human rights institutions, funding human rights units within the Colombian Police and Military, training judges and prosecutors, and training law enforcement personnel in anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, and anti-kidnapping operations.¹²²

The largest part of the assistance package for *Plan Colombia* is support for the expansion of counter-narcotics operations into Southern Colombia. The Congress approved \$390.5 million to help gain control of the drug producing regions of Southern Colombia. Specifically, this funding supports the training and equipping of Colombian counter-narcotics battalions. Equipment purchases include procurement and support of 14 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters; procurement, refurbishment, and support of 30UH-1H Huey II helicopters, and support of 15 UH-1N helicopters. This part of the funding also supports humanitarian assistance and development components. More than \$15 million will be used to help persons displaced by the conflict, while \$10 million will support technical and agricultural assistance for farmers in the region.¹²³

Support for alternative economic development includes more than \$81 million for Colombia, \$85 million for Bolivia, and \$8 million for Ecuador. These funds are primarily intended to assist small framers who grow poppies, coca, and marijuana make the transition to legal farming as crop eradication makes growing drug crops unprofitable. These funds are in addition to money provided by both Colombia and the United Nations for alternative economic development. These funds will be used to assist with displaced persons, voluntary eradication efforts, local governmental assistance, and environmental programs.¹²⁴

Support for increased interdiction provides more than \$129 million to enhance both United States and Colombian interdiction efforts. While the majority of the funds (\$68 million) will be used to upgrade Customs Service P-3 airborne early warning interdiction aircraft, the remainder will be used to assist Colombia and other Caribbean countries with their airborne, naval, and riverine interdiction and intelligence efforts.¹²⁵

The last category of support for *Plan Colombia* is more than \$115 million to support the Colombian National Police. This part of the package includes: \$26 million for procurement, training, and support for two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters; \$20.6 million for 12 UH-1H Huey II helicopters; and \$20 million for purchase of Ayers S2R T-65 agricultural spray aircraft and OV-10 aircraft. This funding also includes money for communications equipment, ammunition, spare parts, training, and logistics.¹²⁶

The United States effort in support of *Plan Colombia* includes a number of provisos. The first proviso is that Colombia continues ongoing peace initiatives with both the FARC and the ELN.¹²⁷ The United States seeks to enhance the peace process by providing policy advisors and funding negotiation training for Government of Colombia negotiators.¹²⁸ Colin Powell, in one of his first news conferences as Secretary of State, pledged the support of the State Department to find a political solution to Colombia's insurgent war.¹²⁹ It is the end of the war, and with it the end of FARC and ELN security support to the drug traffickers, that is seen as the linchpin for success of *Plan Colombia*.

The second proviso of United States support is that all counter-narcotics support for Colombia "will continue to be in the form of training, goods and services."¹³⁰ In effect, this means that the Colombian Police and Armed Forces will implement all counter-narcotics components of *Plan Colombia*. This is one of the single most important conditions of the United States' support effort. It signals that no members of the United States Armed Forces will take a direct role in counter-narcotics efforts within Colombia.

The third proviso to United States support, and one that routinely generates a tremendous amount of press coverage, is the restriction that assistance to the Colombian Military and National Police is only provided under strict application of United States law. In short, the "Leahy Amendment" restricts the United States from providing assistance to any Colombian unit for which there is credible evidence of gross human rights violations, unless the Secretary of State can certify that the Colombian government has taken steps to bring those responsible to justice.¹³¹

Oddly, it is this very point that has made President Pastrana's plan unpopular in some sectors of Colombian society and the military. Many people within those parts of Colombian society support the efforts of right-wing paramilitary groups who seek to disrupt efforts of both the insurgent groups and the drug traffickers. These same people also see hypocrisy in the United States' insistence that Colombia deal with the drug war and insurgency without resorting to harsher measures.¹³²

CHAPTER THREE

UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND *PLAN COLOMBIA*

At the turn of the 21st Century, Colombia faces the challenge of consolidating the state's central responsibilities. It must recover confidence among its citizens, and in so doing, the basic canons of coexistence in society. The Commitment of the government is to recover the states central responsibilities: the promotion of democracy, a monopoly on the application of justice, territorial integrity, the generation of conditions for employment, respect for human rights and human dignity and the preservation of public order.

Colombian President Pastrana
*Plan Colombia*¹³³

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND *PLAN COLOMBIA*

Webster's defines "interest" as "regard for one's advantage or benefit".¹³⁴ Such a broad definition is not of much utility in defining what is in a country's national interest. The United States National Security Strategy, in attempting to define our country's national interests, creates three tiers, or categories, of national interests: vital interests, important national interests, and humanitarian and other interests.

The first category, *vital interests*, are those "of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation."¹³⁵ The National Security Strategy goes on to list the physical security of the United States and its allies, the safety of our citizens, the economic well-being of our society, and the protection of our critical infrastructures as being among our vital national interests.¹³⁶

The second category, *important national interests*, "do not effect our national survival, but they do effect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live."¹³⁷ Examples of important national interests included in the National Security Strategy are regions where we have large economic interests, alliances, protecting the global environment, and preventing refugee crises.¹³⁸ It is usually when these "less than vital interests" are at stake that the American Congress and public become embroiled in debate concerning United States involvement. Critics with more isolationist tendencies will usually attempt to turn the United

States away from intervention, while interventionists find much justification in applying the instruments of national power.

The third and last category of interests, simply labeled *humanitarian and other interests*, require action because “our values demand it.”¹³⁹ Among the interests that the National Security Strategy places in this category are humanitarian assistance, supporting democracy, adherence to the rule of law and civilian control of the military, de-mining assistance, and promoting sustainable development and environmental protection.¹⁴⁰ This category of catchall interests seems almost open-ended and likely could be used to enhance support for United States involvement, rather than justify it in and of itself. Also, it is logical that many of these lesser national interests involve situations where early intervention can prevent situations where more vital interests come into play at a later time.

With an understanding of the National Security Strategy in mind, how do the issues at stake in *Plan Colombia* effect United States national interests? President Clinton, in his October 2000 report to congress required by the Plan Colombia Aid Package law, states that the “ongoing, multiple, and inter-related crises in Colombia effect a broad range of United States interests.”¹⁴¹ Our vital interests are at stake because the cocaine and heroine production in Colombia constitutes a threat to the well-being of our citizens.¹⁴² More than 90% of cocaine used in the United States originates in or passes through Colombia. Additionally, the cultivation of opium poppies in Colombia has expanded from virtually zero in 1990 to more than 7,500 hectares in 2000, enough to produce eight tons of refined heroin and supply almost half of the demand in the United States.¹⁴³ Drug-related crime and organized crime, a by-product of the insatiable demand for drugs in America, also adversely effects the well-being and safety of our citizens.

Another way in which our vital interests are at stake in Colombia is the adverse way that the drug war effects our economic well-being. As stated before, more than \$20 billion is spent annually fighting drug crime, while estimates show that drugs cost the American economy more than \$110 billion annually.¹⁴⁴ Unfortunately, a large percentage of this \$110 million annually

flows out of the country.¹⁴⁵ For all of this money we are bereft of any benefit and laden with the adverse effects of drug use, abuse, and wastage. This negative drain on the United States economy has long-term implications for the health of our economic well-being. To compound this problem, we are left with some degree of corruption in United States law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, banks, and other vital institutions as tremendous amounts of money flow from drug-traffickers through the money laundering apparatus of the drug world. The drug problem also clogs our courts, distracts law enforcement from other serious criminal problems, fills our prisons, creates a rogue underground economy, and degrades the values of our society.¹⁴⁶

Our important national interests are equally at stake. Most importantly, the regional security of the Caribbean and South American region is at stake in Colombia. The expanded drug trade generates vast amounts of money – and with it influence and corruption. This situation has created a large and illegitimate non-state actor in the region. Drug cartels, buoyed by security support from the Colombian insurgent organizations, have managed to maintain near-sovereignty over more than 40% of Colombian lands.¹⁴⁷ Exacerbating the problem of the drug cartels' strength and power is the fact that the cartels have no political or popular support, deriving all power from the end of a gun barrel or their ill-gotten gains.

Humanitarian and other interests are also at stake in Colombia. Most importantly, the preservation of the Colombian democracy is at risk. Since the days of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has taken a great, almost paternalistic interest in the health of South American democracies. Expounded to protect South American countries from exploitation by European and "other" powers, the Monroe Doctrine also gives the United States the moral responsibility for assisting those countries struggling to implement American-style democratic movements.¹⁴⁸ Seen in this light, the United States has incurred an almost contractual obligation to render assistance to Colombia's attempt to forge a true representational democratic republic free from the influence of criminally supported insurgencies. Further, a stable and secure democracy in Colombia is vital to the preservation of human rights, the rule of law, and the civilian control of the military.

The insurgency in Colombia, while having lasted for a very long time, has a number of unique characteristics that help justify United States involvement. First, unlike some other socialist or communist based insurgencies in which the United States has become involved, the Colombian insurgencies are not well supported by the “masses”. While Colombia is a country of more than 35 million people – roughly the population of California – the armed membership of the insurgent movements have never totaled more than 20,000 individuals.¹⁴⁹ Perhaps the support by the Soviet Bloc and its Cuban partner helped to mitigate the paltry size of the “revolution” and its lack of popular support. However, the decline in worldwide communism has led to further declines in support for the FARC and ELN.

This lack of popular support by the Colombian people leads to a second unique feature of the Colombian insurgencies. Both main insurgent organizations, as well as numerous other smaller groups, have resorted to partnerships with drug traffickers and cartels to remain viable. In this way, both the FARC and ELN have evolved from political-based insurgencies to drug profit-based criminal organizations.¹⁵⁰ Correspondingly, the insurgencies have, to some degree, lost sight of the very principles for which they were formed, mainly land reform, economic reform, and government support for social and legal reforms.¹⁵¹ Oddly enough, the popularity of Colombian drugs in the United States has created a unique situation where a foreign insurgency against a United States ally is obtaining its de facto support from a large segment of American society.

From the issues presented thus far, it is clear that the Colombian drug trafficking and the Colombian civil war both pose direct threats to United States national interests – vital interests, important interests, and other interests. The scope and complexity of the issues involved make it clear that a failure of Plan Colombia could easily lead to a collapse of United States drug war, anarchy within Colombia, and regional instability South America. President Clinton, in his October 2000 Plan Colombia Strategy Report, best summed up the need for American involvement when he stated that

“...U.S. financial, technical, and political support is essential if we hope to avoid allowing Colombia’s inter-related crisis to effect our nation adversely, and to undermine democracy and stability in Colombia and the region in the near term.”¹⁵²

However, this makes it clear that United States interests are at stake, it does not necessarily support direct military involvement. For that we must turn to the United States National Drug Control Policy and National Military Strategy to determine how the Drug Czar and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff view the application of military power toward those ends.

The National Drug Control Strategy is an unusual document. Because the Drug Czar serves to coordinate all United States effort toward the drug problem, the Drug Strategy is a broad and overreaching document that maps out the whole effort toward combating illicit drugs. In other words, the Drug Strategy is a document that encapsulates the United States’ national effort toward one problem. This is distinctly different from the National Military Strategy, which conversely explains United States policy in applying a single instrument of national power toward a broad range of problems.

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY AND THE DRUG WAR

The National Drug Control Strategy: 2001 Annual Report, as its full name implies, also serves as an annual progress report on all national efforts toward curbing the drug problem. The report describes a two-fold strategy aimed to reduce or eliminate the drug problem. In order to do this the strategy seeks to reduce the demand for drugs within the United States while breaking both foreign and domestic supply chains. General McCaffrey delineates five major goals of the National Drug Control Strategy:

1. Educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.
2. Increase the safety of America’s citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
3. Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drugs by reducing the treatment gap.
4. Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

5. Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.¹⁵³

A close look at each of these five goals reveals that only the last two could conceivably involve the use of military force. Goal number four, shielding United States borders, can be supported by the United States military, but must be done within the bounds of such laws as *Posse Comitatus*, which places great restrictions upon the use of military force in domestic law enforcement. Therefore, it is only in pursuing the last of these five objectives that the United States military can be of utility and where support to *Plan Colombia* can be considered.

The National Drug Control Strategy further breaks down the goal of supply reduction into five subordinate goals. These sub-goals are:

1. Eliminate drug cultivation and production.
2. Destroy drug-trafficking organizations.
3. Interdict drug shipments.
4. Encourage international cooperation.
5. Safeguard democracy and human rights.

The Strategy goes on to explain that efforts at supply-reduction must be focused on source countries. It also states that trafficking and production infrastructures are concentrated, and are therefore easier to disrupt than other aspects of the drug trade. Lastly, the Strategy explains that the United States seeks to bolster “source-country resources, capabilities, and political will to reduce cultivation, attack production, interdict drug shipments, and dismantle trafficking organizations, including their command and control structure along with its financial underpinnings.”¹⁵⁴

A large part of the 2001 Annual Report is an update on ongoing programs. Four sub-chapters of the report are dedicated to demand reduction or drug crime fighting efforts. A fifth sub-chapter deals with “Shielding U.S. Borders from the Drug Threat”. A sixth and final sub-chapter is dedicated to “Reducing the supply of illicit drugs.” Within this sub-chapter the Drug Control Strategy explains the need to support Plan Colombia. This support is needed in order to

reduce the flow of drugs entering the United States. General McCaffrey states that "... (b) y assisting the government of Colombia in implementing the rule of law in drug-producing regions, we are helping to decrease drug production and trafficking diminish the corrosive influence of drug-related corruption."¹⁵⁵

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE DRUG WAR

The United States Military Strategy, published in 1997, begins by stating that the purpose of the Armed Forces is "to deter threats of organized violence against the United States and its interests, and to defeat such threats should deterrence fail."¹⁵⁶ The strategy goes on to explain that the United States military must be prepared to execute this strategy within the context of a strategic environment that is characterized by a number of uncertainties, including threats to American security.¹⁵⁷ Listed among these threats to our security are regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, and transnational dangers. It is within this last category that the international drug trade is listed.¹⁵⁸

The National Military Strategy also enumerates two national military objectives. The first of these objectives is to promote peace and stability. In order to promote peace and stability the United States may be forced to "deter or defeat aggression." or "conduct operations or otherwise contribute to efforts that seek to prevent conflict and reduce threats."¹⁵⁹ The second national military objective is to defeat adversaries. In the event of armed conflict the United States will "render an adversary incapable of armed resistance through destruction of his capacity to threaten our interests or by breaking his will to do so."¹⁶⁰

The National Military Strategy is based upon the strategic concept "Shape, Respond and Prepare Now." It explains that the United States must *Shape* the global environment in order to create conditions favorable to the United States and its interests. The United States must *Respond* to crisis across the full spectrum of conflict in order to protect our interests. Lastly, as we conduct these shaping and responding activities, we should *Prepare Now* for the conditions of the

uncertain future. It is primarily within the *Shape* and *Respond* parts of the strategy that military response to the drug threat can be found.

The strategy explains that in order to shape the environment in a way favorable to United States interests, the military can use its inherent deterrent qualities and peacetime military engagement to achieve that end. It does so by promoting stability, by preventing or reducing conflicts and threats, and through peacetime deterrence. Promoting stability includes all those actions taken to promote stability, increase the security of allies and friends, and ensure global stability. Military activities such as training of allied armed forces fall under this category. There is an even greater role for the United States military in preventing or reducing conflicts or threats. The military's unique logistical and operational capabilities lend itself to supporting the reduction of drug cultivation, production, and trafficking in order to reduce the supply of drugs flowing into the United States.¹⁶¹

The second primary way in which military power may be applied to the drug threat may be found in the *Respond* part of the military strategy. The strategy enumerates military responses as deterring aggression, fighting and winning wars, and conducting multiple, concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations¹⁶². Deterrence is defined as those activities that prevent the adversary from taking action so "the situation does not require a greater US response."¹⁶³ Fighting and winning wars is among the primary purposes of military power, but is not within the context of this study. The last category of military responses – conducting multiple, concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations – includes the use of the full array of military capabilities to achieve national aims. It is primarily within this category of military response that efforts at fighting the drug war can be found. The National Military Strategy states that:

Unique military capabilities can also support domestic authorities in combating direct and indirect threats to the US homeland, such as the illegal drug trade, especially when the potential for violence exceeds that capability of domestic agencies.¹⁶⁴

CHAPTER FOUR

U. S. LAW, THE DRUG WAR AND *PLAN COLOMBIA*

The U.S. military became an instrument of foreign drug policy because civilians could not stop the importation of illicit drugs. By deciding that the U.S. drug epidemic could only be eliminated by reducing the supply of drugs, policy makers opened the door to military involvement, for the U.S. military can and does operate outside the United States.

Doanld J. Mabry
The Role of the Military
Drugs and Foreign Policy¹⁶⁵

The Department of Defense's role in the War on Drugs was minimal prior to 1989. Up until the end of President Ronald Reagan's second term, there was little impetus to involve the United States military in any role that detracted from its Cold War mission. A preponderance of the military in 1988 was forward deployed or involved in intense stateside training in preparation for anticipated conflict in Europe, Asia, or the Middle East. However, beginning in 1989 Congress began to put pressure on the Executive Branch to give the military a more active role in counter-drug operations.¹⁶⁶

The pressure from congress to involve the Department of Defense in counter-narcotics operations was not, and has not been, without opposition. Longstanding tradition in the United States, codified by the Posse Comitatus Act first passed in 1878, prohibits federal military forces from "searching, seizing, arresting, or conducting any related law enforcement activity involving civilians."¹⁶⁷ As a result, the law enforcement role of the military within the United States and at its borders has been to assist and support other federal agencies in their counter-narcotics roles. Congress has given the military the authority, under Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections #371-378, to assist other federal law enforcement agencies. This part of the federal code allows the military to provide training, assistance, equipment, and facilities to these agencies, so long as such

support does not effect military readiness.¹⁶⁸ This restriction, however, does not apply outside the borders or territorial waters of the United States.

Title 32 of the United States Code holds similar provisions to that of Title 10, but applies to the National Guard. Title 32 allows the National Guard to support counter-narcotics operations under the command and control of the governor. However, National Guard forces acting in such a role may not conduct counter-narcotics activities that violate state law. As a rule, the National Guard Bureau has established policies that place great restrictions on law enforcement activities conducted by Guard personnel. In short, other law enforcement agencies usually take the lead in such activities as searches, seizures, arrests, and inspections. Once federalized by the president, the provisions of Title 32 no longer apply and the provisions of Title 10 take effect.¹⁶⁹

Between 1989 and 1995 the Secretary of Defense issued a number of guidance memoranda on the role of the military in the President's Drug Control Strategy. These memorandums serve as the basis for why, how, and where the military will give such support as intended under Title 10, U.S. Code and other provisions of law. The early memoranda make it clear that there is a distinct connection between the drug war and the national security of the United States. The later memoranda make specific provisions for initiatives to be undertaken by the military in support of the drug war.

In September of 1989 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney published a memorandum giving the Defense Department guidance on implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy. In this memorandum, Secretary Cheney states that the flow of drugs into the country poses a "direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the country."¹⁷⁰ This document also lays out a framework for Department of Defense activities in support of the drug war. This framework lists (1) attacking drugs at the source, (2) attacking drugs in transit from source countries into the United States, and (3) attacking the distribution of drugs within the United States.¹⁷¹

The important part of this memorandum for the purposes of this study lies within its guidance to attacking drugs at their source. Within this context, Secretary Cheney states that there are three ways in which the United States military can help to interdict the flow of drugs from their source. These three methods are (1) assisting in nation building, (2) operational support to host nation forces, and (3) cooperation with host country forces to prevent the export of the drugs from the source. The memorandum goes on to state that the United States armed forces should be prepared to assist host nations with their own counter-narcotics activities. Specifically, the United States military can provide "substantial assistance in training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, logistics, medical support, and civic action in connection with foreign forces' operations against the infrastructure of drug-producing criminal enterprises."¹⁷²

Secretary Cheney signed a second shorter memorandum that same day in 1989. In this subsequent memorandum, Secretary Cheney stated that one of his administration's principal foreign policy objectives would be to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States. He goes on to state that the flow of drugs is a "high priority security mission of the Department of Defense."¹⁷³ This memorandum is important in that it is the first indication in recent times that counter-narcotics operations had ceased to be a secondary Defense mission and had in fact become a priority mission.

In 1993 Secretary of Defense William Perry issued another memorandum to the Department of Defense that issued guidance on the conduct of military support to the drug war. This new memorandum reinforced Secretary Cheney's previous guidance and refocused the Defense Department's efforts in light of the new National Drug Control Strategy promulgated by the Drug Czar. This new memorandum also issued specific program guidance for five efforts:

- (1) Source Nation Support. The memorandum specifically cites Colombia as one of three countries for which the Defense Department should provide training and operational support.
- (2) Dismantling the Cartels. This program calls for the Defense Department to linguist support, intelligence analysis, and intelligence gathering and sharing in support of the Drug Enforcement Agency's "Kingpin Strategy".
- (3) Detection and monitoring of the Transport of illegal drugs. This program specifically calls for the military to provide support to the host nation to detect the transport of drugs within the drug-source country.
- (4) Direct support to law enforcement agencies – domestically.
- (5) Demand Reduction.¹⁷⁴

Secretary Perry issued another memorandum in 1995 that provided even further guidance to the Department of Defense on counter-drug operations. This memorandum attempted to give more specific guidance in light of the President's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy. This memorandum took the previous list of five programs and titled them as "strategic elements". These five elements were (1) source nation support, (2) dismantling the cartels, (3) detection and monitoring, (4) support to domestic law enforcement agencies, and (5) demand reduction.¹⁷⁵ What this memorandum did, in effect, was to solidify the role of the military in the reduction of drug supply and to retain the primacy of counter-narcotics among the DoD's primary missions.

The most recent legislation or guidance concerning the Defense Department's effort in Colombia and the drug war can be found in the Colombian Aid Package Law of 2000. This law provides a tremendous amount of money (more than \$1.6 billion, as previously stated), but limits the direct role that United States military forces will play in support of *Plan Colombia*. Support is provided in the form of training, equipment

expertise and technical support, limited intelligence, and some command and control support.¹⁷⁶

More specific to counter-drug operations inside Colombia, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM or SOUTHCOM) is charged with responsibility for “counter-drug activities throughout the theater (which includes Colombia) to promote democracy, stability, and collective approaches to threats to regional security.”¹⁷⁷ The USSOUTHCOM mission goes on to state that the command “will, when required, respond unilaterally or multilaterally to crises that threaten stability of national interests.”¹⁷⁸ One of the ways in which SOUTHCOM achieves such stability is to combat the illicit drug trade originating in Colombia.

Colombia is one of six countries within SOUTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility (which includes the Caribbean, Central America, and all of South America), in which the command has placed a Military Group. The Military Group serves as the SOUTHCOM Commander’s representative to the United States ambassador and manages all security assistance programs and special activities.¹⁷⁹ The fact that SOUTHCOM already has such a group in Colombia is testimony to the importance placed on the programs already ongoing in support of the Colombian government and military.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

The fight against the flow of illicit drugs into our country is not a new one. As a country, the United States has been fighting this scourge almost since the country's inception. As the year 2001 passes, this threat from drugs continues to rise in importance as Americans have begun to appreciate just how damaging cocaine, marijuana, and heroin have been – and can still be – to our society. The drug war now stands almost at the forefront of our national security concerns.

Drugs and drug use have effects upon our society that are insidious, far-reaching, and tremendously destructive. The millions of people in America who use drugs regularly suffer severe physical and mental ailments. As a class, drug users are less healthy, are more likely to commit crimes, are more likely to become infected with deadly diseases, such as AIDS and hepatitis, and are far less efficient in the workplace. Drug trafficking brings with it a great degree of criminal behavior and organized crime. Meanwhile, hundreds of billions of dollars flow out of our economy annually to fuel the drug trade.

The three illegal drugs most prevalent in our society – the drug triad – are cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. Drug producers in Colombia, having risen in importance over the past few decades, have become America's number one source of cocaine and a major secondary supplier of marijuana and heroin. As a result, America's war on drugs must be focused to a great degree upon the flow of drugs out of Colombia and into the United States.

America's modern war on drugs, begun under President Richard Nixon, has evolved dramatically over the years. Limited successes have been offset by a myriad of

failures. It was not until the last ten years that America's approach to the drug war evolved into a coherent strategy to fight both demand for drugs and the supply of drugs, while attacking other symptoms of the disease, such as money laundering and organized crime. Most recently, the creation of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the position of Director – the Drug Czar – as a cabinet-level advisor, have lent new impetus to America's counter-narcotics efforts.

As the Drug Czar has begun to come to grips with the scope of America's monstrous drug problem, Colombia is attempting to solve its own problems. While Colombia – a democratic and once-proud country – suffers as well under the shadow of the drug war, Colombian drug lords run a multi-billion dollar underworld economy that benefits the country and its people little. Additionally, Colombia has been fighting a Marxist-Leninist insurgency for more than 35 years. This insurgency, never having gained much popular support and having lost support from the USSR and Cuba, has turned to the drug lords to trade security for assistance. The insurgency in Colombia, represented by its two largest groups, the FARC and ELN, have become heavily armed protectors of the drug lords and drug crop growers.

Further exacerbating Colombia's problems are unresolved land reform, the rise of violent right-wing paramilitary death squads, and a stagnant traditional economy. In an attempt to help lift Colombia out of this morass, Colombian President Pastrana has initiated *Plan Colombia* – a five part plan that seeks to end the insurgency through a “non-military” settlement, destroy drug production and trafficking, restore the economy, protect human rights, and foster democracy and the rule of law. Pastrana's plan, recognizing the fact that Colombia's insurgency, economy, and the drug war are all interrelated, has sought the help of the world in implementing *Plan Colombia*.

President Pastrana estimates that *Plan Colombia* will take more than \$7.5 billion to implement, seeking more than \$3.5 from the international community. The United

States pledged more than \$1.63 billion toward the effort. However, United States support comes with strings attached. Specifically, the United States insists that the peace process with the insurgent organizations continue, that support is restricted to organizations in the Colombian police and military with clean human rights records, and – most importantly – that counter-narcotics support be only in the form of training, goods, and services. This final proviso limits the U.S. military from taking a direct role in the counter-narcotics part of *Plan Colombia*.

In attempting to determine whether or not it is in the interest of the United States to take a direct military role in Plan Colombia, this monograph sought to trace the issues involved in the plan through the United States National Security. By doing so, it is possible to determine if national interests are at stake in the plan. Secondly, the National Drug Control Strategy was examined to determine if the President's primary advisor for drug policy saw a military role in resolving any interests discovered in the Security Strategy. Finally, the National Military Strategy was examined to determine how the United States military viewed its participation in Plan Colombia.

The National Security Strategy describes three levels of interests, vital interests, important interests, and humanitarian and other interests. Among our vital national interests that intersect with those raised in Plan Colombia is the physical security of our citizens. Based upon the health, crime, and economic effects of drugs from Colombia, it is clear that the interdiction of drugs from Colombia rises to the level of a vital national interest. Among our important national interests at stake in Plan Colombia are the security of the South American/Caribbean region and the preservation of the Colombian democracy. Both the drug cartels and the insurgents – who gain support from the drug trade – threaten the health of Colombian democracy and the resulting stability of the region. The United States' humanitarian interests are also at stake in helping to resolve the human suffering and lack of justice that results from a divided Colombia.

The National Drug Control Strategy reiterates much that is contained within the National Security Strategy and then goes on to explain how those tenets can be applied, in an interagency method, to attack the drug problem. The Drug Czar expounds a two-tiered strategy of reducing demand for the drugs while interdicting supply, both in transit and in the source country. Two of the Strategy's five major goals are to shield America's frontiers from the drug threat and break foreign and domestic supplies of drugs. This "supply reduction" centers on the five sub-goals of eliminating production, destroying organizations, interdicting shipments, encouraging international cooperation, and safeguarding democracy and human rights.

It is clear from examining the Drug Control Strategy that the Drug Czar does not believe it possible to win the war on drugs without reducing supply. It is also clear that among the tasks that must be accomplished are the destruction of crops and production facilities, the destruction of drug organizations, and the interdiction of supplies. The military's unique capabilities are clearly best suited to this role.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) was also examined. The military strategy, the NMS explains, is put forth within the context of uncertainties and threats for which the military must be prepared to respond. Listed among the transnational dangers is the international drug trade. The NMS then goes on to state that the strategy's objectives are to promote peace and stability (through deterrence or by conducting operations) and to defeat adversaries. By listing the international drug trade as a clear threat, the Strategy makes a clear and convincing case that military power could be used to deter the international drug trade or to defeat and destroy them if necessary.

Also found within the NMS is the strategic concept of "Shape, Respond, and Prepare now." The NMS explains that the United States should shape the global environment to conditions which favor the United States and its interests, respond to crisis along the full spectrum of conflict, and prepare now for future threats. Within this

framework, it is clear that the military can use its unique capabilities within Colombia to deter the drug trafficking organizations, destroy or defeat them if necessary, and to help establish stability for Colombia while setting favorable conditions for the United States.

The final part of this monograph was the exploration of laws and directives that might clarify what role the United States military can take in fighting the drug war in foreign soil. Posse Comitatus and American legal tradition prohibit military involvement in most forms of domestic law enforcement. Title 10 of U.S. Code allows for the use of military power in support of law enforcement agencies. However, no such prohibitions apply to fighting the drug trade outside of America's borders. In fact, since the end of the cold war, the United States military has become increasingly involved in the supply-reduction side of the drug war.

Between 1989 and 1995 the Secretary of Defense enumerated a number of important considerations concerning the military and the drug war. In 1989 Secretary Cheney stated that drugs were a direct threat to the security of the United States. He also laid out a framework for U.S. military involvement in the drug war that included attacking drugs at the source, attacking drugs in transit, and attacking stateside drug distribution. Secretary Cheney went on to explain that three methods of drug interdiction at the source the military may take a part in are assisting in nation building, providing operational support to host countries, and cooperating with host countries to prevent export from the source countries. Another memorandum published that same day made fighting the drug war a high priority DoD mission.

Subsequent DoD policy memoranda published by Secretary Perry in 1993 and 1995 expanded upon Secretary Cheney's existing guidance. In response to National Drug Control Strategies published in those years, these memoranda expanded upon the DoD's counter-drug mission to include supporting source nations, dismantling cartels, detecting and monitoring the transport of drugs, domestic support to law enforcement,

and demand reduction within the military. These memoranda served to solidify the military's role in counter-narcotics and make direct involvement of the military a real possibility and legality.

Most recently, the passing of the *Plan Colombia* Aid Package Law made support to President Pastrana a reality. This law limits the United States to an indirect role in *Plan Colombia*. It provides for support in the areas of training, technical support, and limited command and control and intelligence support.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, it is clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States to take a role in *Plan Colombia*. The threat posed by the unimpeded flow of drugs into America threatens the very lives and well-being of our citizens. It is also within the important and humanitarian interests of the United States to help stabilize the Colombian democracy, to help stabilize the region, and to help improve humanitarian conditions and the rule of law within Colombia. Lastly, there exists a firm legal and statutory basis, as well as Department of Defense guidance, to justify taking a more direct military role in *Plan Colombia*.

There has been no political decision to take a direct military role in *Plan Colombia*. However, should the United States government make the decision to do so, the U.S. military can make a significant contribution to the success of the *Plan*. The military possesses a number of unique capabilities that are unparalleled in other civil or international organizations. These capabilities include, but are not limited to:

- (1) Coordination of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
- (2) Command, control, and communications.
- (3) Special operations and aviation.
- (4) The ability to respond quickly to changes in mission and tempo.
- (5) The ability to apply force.

(6) The ability to conduct information operations (IO).

Therefore, there are a number of tasks within *Plan Colombia* for which the United States military is well suited.

As was stated before, the drug supply component of the Drug War should be attacked domestically, at the borders, en route from source countries, and within source countries. While the United States military is already to some degree involved in all but the last of these “legs” in the supply chain, the military has not taken a role in interdicting drug supplies within source countries. Military forces should be used to break this part of the drug supply chain as well. There are four points within Colombia at which military force should be applied: (1) at point of cultivation, (2) en route from point of cultivation to point of processing or point of export, (3) at point of drug processing (facilities), and (4) in the information realm.

First, the U.S. military’s ISR capabilities can be an effective force in locating drug crops and routes of movement. Therefore, ISR assets should be used to locate drug-processing facilities and other infrastructures used by the drug traffickers to cultivate, process, and move drugs within Colombia. The military’s ability to collect and analyze intelligence, along with its ability to conduct intelligence preparation of battle space, should be used to determine patterns of behavior and drug trafficking operations to keep drug traffickers from countering efforts at interdiction.

Second, the U.S. military’s ability to provide effective command, control, and communications (C³) should be used to supplement those of the Colombian military and national police in order to coordinate the efforts of all agencies involved in counter-narcotics efforts. While the Colombian government is often well aware of the location of drug cultivation and processing locations, the government is at a C³ disadvantage to drug traffickers; the drug traffickers’ tremendous wealth gives them the ability to employ

highly sophisticated communications equipment, which translates into early warning against the efforts of the military and national police.

Third, the U.S. military's special operations and aviation capabilities should be employed in breaking the Colombian drug supply chain. Special purpose forces provide a range of capabilities, from direct action to human intelligence, that are well suited to counter-narcotics operations in difficult, mountainous terrain. The ability of these forces to strike at long range with a great degree of violence, coupled with their ability to train Colombian counter-narcotics forces, make them well suited for a variety of counter-narcotics tasks. Military aviation, specifically rotary wing aviation, can effectively interdict drugs at virtually any point along the supply route with little advanced warning using vertical envelopment. Aviation also provides the military with the capability to rapidly shift the effort from one location to another. Aviation should be employed in coordination with counter-narcotics and strike forces to rapidly build forces in remote areas to interdict drugs and destroy facilities.

Fourth, U.S. military is able to respond quickly to changes in mission and tempo. In conducting counter-narcotics operations, the Colombians are faced with a mobile, motivated, and highly effective foe. The U.S. military possesses a degree of versatility and flexibility that is greater than that of the Colombian forces. By combining the military efforts of both countries, counter-narcotics operations will benefit from an increase in response time, and thus an increase in effectiveness. Also, most American military equipment, units, and headquarters organizations are designed to be very mobile. Additionally, the U.S. military is well practiced at task organizing for specific missions, while maintaining purpose and discipline. These traits all provide a needed degree of adaptability to a counter-narcotics effort that changes constantly.

Fifth and most importantly, the U.S. military brings the ability to apply force. That force ranges from precision munitions for attacking processing facilities to infantry

forces for fighting armed narcotics security forces or insurgents. Any military force deployed to Colombia in support of Plan Colombia should be prepared to apply force to interdict drugs, destroy facilities, assist the government of Colombia, and respond with force to the insurgent organizations (FARC, ELN, or others) should they interfere with U.S. forces. The U.S. military should also use the threat of force in a stability role to protect civilians, infrastructure, and legitimate farmers from coercion by drug traffickers. Alternatively, U.S. forces could also be used to free Colombian military forces from other ancillary tasks in order to conduct counter-narcotics operations unhindered.

Sixth, and lastly, U.S. military forces should be used in Colombia in an information role. By involving U.S. forces in a direct role, the U.S. will be sharing in the burdens and dangers of the counter-narcotics effort. Because many Colombians feel that the U.S., as the largest consumer of Colombian drugs, bears part of the responsibility for the problem, involving U.S. troops would demonstrably communicate to the Colombian people our commitment to fighting the problem. American forces would also provide an example of the role of the military in a democracy. Contact between senior American and Colombian military leaders can help to reinforce the importance of subjugating the role of the military to that of elected civilian leaders. Also, American participation may help to encourage the rule of law, increase respect for human rights, and reinforce the legitimacy of Colombian legal institutions, thus negating the influence of right wing organizations within the Colombian military and police.

In order to accomplish all of these recommendations, the United States should create a Joint Task Force (JTF), perhaps combined with Colombian Forces into a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), to conduct operations in Colombia. That JTF should include combat forces (infantry and/or cavalry), aviation (both fixed and rotary wing), special operations, psychological operations, combat support, intelligence, service support forces, and other forces as required. The JTF commander would be responsible

for all aspects of American support to Plan Colombia. Only by making such a direct commitment to fighting the drug war at its source will the United States effectively eradicate the supply of drugs from America's single largest source of drugs while providing much needed support to an important American ally.

¹ *U.S. Aid to Colombia: U.S. Government Strategy Report Required by Sec. 3202 of the Colombian Aid Package Law, October 26, 2000* (The White House, 2000, accessed March 15 2001).

² The terms "drugs" and "illicit drugs" will be used synonymously throughout the paper. Both terms will be used to refer to illicit narcotic substances rather than to lawful over-the-counter or subscription medicinal drugs. The unlawful abuse of lawful, yet controlled narcotics is also problematic, but is an entirely separate issue and will not be covered in this monograph.

³ Elaine Shannon, *Desparados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and the War America Can't Win* (New York: Penguin Group, 1988), ix. United States efforts to combat the trade and use of illicit drugs at the national level go back to the end of the 19th century. In 1906 the United States convened a meeting in Shanghai, China to consider international help for China in combating the opium trade. See: Raphael F. Perl, ed. *Drugs and Foreign Policy: A Critical Review* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

⁴ William W. Mendel and Murl D. Munger, *Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1997), 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1999), 3.

⁷ Shannon, 1-43.

⁸ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2000 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2000), 9.

⁹ Nicholas Thompson, "Why Clinton's Colombia Policy Needs Rehab," *The Washington Monthly* 32, no. 4 (2000).

¹⁰ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2000 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2000), 117.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 118.

¹² Thompson.

¹³ Jay Nordlinger, "Clinton's Good Soldier," *National Review* 51, no. 8 (1999).

¹⁴ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2000 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2000), iii.

¹⁵ Mendel and Munger, 1.

¹⁶ *GAO Report: Narcotics Threat from Columbia Continues to Grow* (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, 1999), 1-2.

¹⁷ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2000 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2000), 93-95.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 93.

¹⁹ Steven Dudley, "The Colombian Quagmire," *The American Prospect* 11, no. 17 (2000).

²⁰ *Plan Colombia* (Government of Colombia, 2000, accessed February 15 2001); available from <http://www.plancolombia.com/Plan.html>.

²¹ *U.S. Support for Colombian Initiative Plan Colombia* (U.S. Department of State, 2001, accessed February 18 2001); available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/columbia>.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *U.S. Support for Colombian Initiative Plan Colombia: Fact Sheet, Frequently Asked Questions* (U.S. Department of State, 2001, accessed February 18 2001); available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/columbia/crop6.htm>.

²⁴ Clinton.

²⁵ H. Richard Friman, *NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), ix.

²⁶ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2000 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2000), 9.

²⁷ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2001 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2001), 5.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Report to the President and the Attorney General, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986), 71.

³³ *Ibid.*, 461.

³⁴ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2001 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2001), 30.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Report to the President and the Attorney General, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986), 461.

³⁷ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2001 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2001), 138.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 138.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁴² *Report to the President and the Attorney General, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986), 15.

⁴³ Anne H. Soukhanov and Kaethe Ellis, eds. *Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 1117.

⁴⁴ Sharon Begley, "How It All Starts inside Your Brain," *Newsweek*, February 12 2001, 41.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁴⁶ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2001 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2001), 138-139.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 174.

⁴⁸ Soukhanov and Ellis, eds., 579.

⁴⁹ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2001 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2001), 18.

⁵⁰ *Report to the President and the Attorney General, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986), 33.

⁵¹ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2001 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2001), 175.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 19.

⁵³ *Report to the President and the Attorney General, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986), 54.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 56-57.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁵⁷ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2001 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2001), 138.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁵⁹ Perl, ed., 3.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 2.

⁶¹ *Report to the President and the Attorney General, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986), 190.

⁶² Perl, ed., 3.

⁶³ *Report to the President and the Attorney General, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986).

⁶⁴ Ibid., 188.

⁶⁵ Perl, ed., 1-4.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 4.

⁶⁷ *Report to the President and the Attorney General, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986), 194.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 196.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 204.

⁷⁰ Carl H. Builder, *Measuring the Leverage: Assessing Military Contributions to Drug Interdiction* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1993), 7.

⁷¹ Perl, ed., 12.

⁷² *Report to the President and the Attorney General, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986), 206.

⁷³ Ibid., 213-215.

⁷⁴ Perl, ed., 19-20.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 21.

⁷⁶ *Report to the President and the Attorney General, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986), 215-216.

⁷⁷ Perl, ed., 25.

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¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

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¹²⁸ *U.S. Aid to Colombia: U.S. Government Strategy Report Required by Sec. 3202 of the Colombian Aid Package Law, October 26, 2000* (The White House, 2000, accessed March 15 2001).

¹²⁹ *Transcript: Secretary Powell's News Briefing with Mexican Foreign Minister, January 30, 2001* (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, 2001, accessed February 18 2001); available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/powell30.htm>.

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¹³⁵ Clinton, 1.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 2.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 2.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 2-3.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 2.

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¹⁴⁴ *National Drug Control Strategy: 2000 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2000), 117.

¹⁴⁵ Thompson.

¹⁴⁶ Mendel and Munger, 8-11.

¹⁴⁷ Linda Robinson, "Guerillas in the Mist," *The New Republic* 221, no. 10 (1999).

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¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹⁵⁶ John M. Shalikashvili, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now -- a Military Strategy for a New Era* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), 5.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

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